Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly
We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reacti...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Conferencia o artículo de un taller. |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2007
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| Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7813/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf |
| Sumario: | We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models
where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic
social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We
examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of
both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have
two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot
equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits
and domestic social surplus and compare the volume
of commodities for various combinations of weak and
strong leaders and followers. |
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