Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly
We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reacti...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Conferencia o artículo de un taller. |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2007
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| Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7813/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf |
| _version_ | 1824370547545341952 |
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| author | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
| author_facet | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
| author_sort | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. |
| collection | Repositorio Institucional |
| description | We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models
where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic
social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We
examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of
both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have
two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot
equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits
and domestic social surplus and compare the volume
of commodities for various combinations of weak and
strong leaders and followers. |
| format | Conferencia o artículo de un taller. |
| id | eprints-7813 |
| institution | UANL |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| record_format | eprints |
| spelling | eprints-78132015-10-14T21:54:16Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/7813/ Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers. 2007 Conferencia o artículo de un taller. PeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/7813/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/7813/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2007) Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. In: International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control, 2007, Kumamoto, Japón. |
| spellingShingle | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png |
| title | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_full | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_fullStr | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_short | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_sort | stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| url | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7813/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kalashnikovvyacheslavv stackelbergequilibriuminamixedduopoly AT corderofrancoalvaroeduardo stackelbergequilibriuminamixedduopoly AT kalashnikovvitaly stackelbergequilibriuminamixedduopoly |