Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete inf...
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| Formato: | Tesis |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf |
| Sumario: | How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How
are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without
centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information
are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1
. Behavioral
extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent
model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized
trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a
generally valid model of decentralized price formation |
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