An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information

This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible st...

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Main Authors: González Treviño, Javier, Kalashnikov, Vitaly
Format: Sección de libro.
Language:English
Published: Springer 2012
Online Access:http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf
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author González Treviño, Javier
Kalashnikov, Vitaly
author_facet González Treviño, Javier
Kalashnikov, Vitaly
author_sort González Treviño, Javier
collection Repositorio Institucional
description This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargainingwith incomplete information is formulated.
format Sección de libro.
id eprints-7693
institution UANL
language English
publishDate 2012
publisher Springer
record_format eprints
spelling eprints-76932015-10-06T22:28:03Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/ An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information González Treviño, Javier Kalashnikov, Vitaly This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargainingwith incomplete information is formulated. Springer 2012 Sección de libro. PeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf González Treviño, Javier y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2012) An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information. In: Intelligent decision technologies. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 109-118. ISBN 9783642299766
spellingShingle González Treviño, Javier
Kalashnikov, Vitaly
An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
thumbnail https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png
title An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
title_full An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
title_fullStr An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
title_full_unstemmed An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
title_short An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
title_sort alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
url http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf
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