An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information

This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible st...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: González Treviño, Javier, Kalashnikov, Vitaly
Format: Sección de libro.
Language:English
Published: Springer 2012
Online Access:http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf
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Summary:This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargainingwith incomplete information is formulated.