An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information
This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible st...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Sección de libro. |
Lenguaje: | inglés |
Publicado: |
Springer
2012
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Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf |
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author | González Treviño, Javier Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
author_facet | González Treviño, Javier Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
author_sort | González Treviño, Javier |
collection | Repositorio Institucional |
description | This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the
implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargainingwith incomplete information is formulated. |
format | Sección de libro. |
id | eprints-7693 |
institution | UANL |
language | English |
publishDate | 2012 |
publisher | Springer |
record_format | eprints |
spelling | eprints-76932015-10-06T22:28:03Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/ An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information González Treviño, Javier Kalashnikov, Vitaly This paper seeks to analyze the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by using incomplete information. Specifically, we want to analyze the implications on the uniqueness and existence of equilibrium when individuals form expectations with different distributions of all possible states. This is done by postulating an alternative view of uncertainty in decision making in economic interactions. Thus an alternative model of bilateral bargainingwith incomplete information is formulated. Springer 2012 Sección de libro. PeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf González Treviño, Javier y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2012) An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information. In: Intelligent decision technologies. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 109-118. ISBN 9783642299766 |
spellingShingle | González Treviño, Javier Kalashnikov, Vitaly An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png |
title | An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
title_full | An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
title_fullStr | An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
title_full_unstemmed | An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
title_short | An alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
title_sort | alternative view of uncertainty in bilateral bargaining models with incomplete information |
url | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7693/1/An%20alternative%20View%20of%20uncertainty%20in%20bilateral%20bargaining%20Models%20with%20incomplete%20information.pdf |
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