Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete inf...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Tesis |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf |
| _version_ | 1824371362047721472 |
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| author | González Gutiérrez, José Javier |
| author_facet | González Gutiérrez, José Javier |
| author_sort | González Gutiérrez, José Javier |
| collection | Repositorio Institucional |
| description | How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How
are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without
centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information
are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1
. Behavioral
extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent
model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized
trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a
generally valid model of decentralized price formation |
| format | Tesis |
| id | eprints-10990 |
| institution | UANL |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| record_format | eprints |
| spelling | eprints-109902019-12-03T18:59:33Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/ Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets González Gutiérrez, José Javier How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1 . Behavioral extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a generally valid model of decentralized price formation 2015 Tesis NonPeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/1080215488.pdf González Gutiérrez, José Javier (2015) Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets. Doctorado thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León. |
| spellingShingle | González Gutiérrez, José Javier Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png |
| title | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| title_full | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| title_fullStr | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| title_short | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| title_sort | intertemporal competitive equilibrium a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
| url | http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gonzalezgutierrezjosejavier intertemporalcompetitiveequilibriumacomputationalmodelofintermediacyinspeculativemarkets |