Political institutions and tax rate initiatives
In a model of a representative democracy, we incorporate into the analysis of tax design the constitutional provision that allows voters to propose tax initiatives. In this paper, we present a theory of tax substitution as the rationale for a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. In our model the tax sys...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
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Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León
2009
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| Acceso en línea: | https://ensayos.uanl.mx/index.php/ensayos/article/view/91 |
| _version_ | 1824325146198933504 |
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| author | Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto |
| author_facet | Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto |
| author_sort | Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto |
| collection | Artículos de Revistas UANL |
| description | In a model of a representative democracy, we incorporate into the analysis of tax design the constitutional provision that allows voters to propose tax initiatives. In this paper, we present a theory of tax substitution as the rationale for a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. In our model the tax system at the status quo is determined by the electoral competition between parties. This political institution aggregates the voters’ preferences for tax policy according to the voters’ marginal proportion of the expected vote that different coalition of voters can deliver in the election. The approval of a TRL, however, depends on the majority rule, and it aggregates the preferences of the median voter of tax initiatives. Thus, a TRL is the result of two political institutions with different mechanisms to aggregate the preferences of voters. Moreover, our paper distinguishes the role of perfect and imperfect information on the distribution of voters´ preferences for tax systems in approving a tax initiative. In this paper we identify conditions on the distribution of preferences and income of the electorate and the median voter that guarantee the approval (rejection) of tax initiatives. Clasificación JEL: H2; H23; H1 |
| first_indexed | 2025-02-05T19:55:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | ensayos-article-91 |
| institution | UANL |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-02-05T19:55:52Z |
| physical | Ensayos Revista de Economía; Vol. 28 No. 2 (2009): NOVEMBER 2009; 65-94 Ensayos Revista de Economía; Vol. 28 Núm. 2 (2009): NOVIEMBRE 2009; 65-94 2448-8402 1870-221X |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León |
| record_format | ojs |
| spelling | ensayos-article-912023-12-11T11:06:10Z Political institutions and tax rate initiatives Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto Taxation Tax Limitations Redistributive Effects Structure and Scope of Government In a model of a representative democracy, we incorporate into the analysis of tax design the constitutional provision that allows voters to propose tax initiatives. In this paper, we present a theory of tax substitution as the rationale for a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. In our model the tax system at the status quo is determined by the electoral competition between parties. This political institution aggregates the voters’ preferences for tax policy according to the voters’ marginal proportion of the expected vote that different coalition of voters can deliver in the election. The approval of a TRL, however, depends on the majority rule, and it aggregates the preferences of the median voter of tax initiatives. Thus, a TRL is the result of two political institutions with different mechanisms to aggregate the preferences of voters. Moreover, our paper distinguishes the role of perfect and imperfect information on the distribution of voters´ preferences for tax systems in approving a tax initiative. In this paper we identify conditions on the distribution of preferences and income of the electorate and the median voter that guarantee the approval (rejection) of tax initiatives. Clasificación JEL: H2; H23; H1 Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León 2009-11-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article Artículo arbitrado por pares https://ensayos.uanl.mx/index.php/ensayos/article/view/91 10.29105/ensayos28.2-3 Ensayos Revista de Economía; Vol. 28 No. 2 (2009): NOVEMBER 2009; 65-94 Ensayos Revista de Economía; Vol. 28 Núm. 2 (2009): NOVIEMBRE 2009; 65-94 2448-8402 1870-221X en Derechos de autor 2009 Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| spellingShingle | Taxation Tax Limitations Redistributive Effects Structure and Scope of Government Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto Political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/article.gif |
| title | Political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| title_full | Political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| title_fullStr | Political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| title_short | Political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| title_sort | political institutions and tax rate initiatives |
| topic | Taxation Tax Limitations Redistributive Effects Structure and Scope of Government |
| topic_facet | Taxation Tax Limitations Redistributive Effects Structure and Scope of Government |
| url | https://ensayos.uanl.mx/index.php/ensayos/article/view/91 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT poncerodriguezraulalberto politicalinstitutionsandtaxrateinitiatives |