Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets

How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete inf...

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Autor principal: González Gutiérrez, José Javier
Formato: Tesis
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: 2015
Acceso en línea:http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf
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author González Gutiérrez, José Javier
author_facet González Gutiérrez, José Javier
author_sort González Gutiérrez, José Javier
collection Tesis
description How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1 . Behavioral extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a generally valid model of decentralized price formation
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spelling eptesis-109902019-12-03T18:59:33Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/ Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets González Gutiérrez, José Javier How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1 . Behavioral extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a generally valid model of decentralized price formation 2015 Tesis NonPeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/1080215488.pdf González Gutiérrez, José Javier (2015) Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets. Doctorado thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León.
spellingShingle González Gutiérrez, José Javier
Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
thumbnail https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/tesis.png
title Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
title_full Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
title_fullStr Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
title_full_unstemmed Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
title_short Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
title_sort intertemporal competitive equilibrium a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
url http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT gonzalezgutierrezjosejavier intertemporalcompetitiveequilibriumacomputationalmodelofintermediacyinspeculativemarkets