Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets
How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete inf...
Autor principal: | |
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Formato: | Tesis |
Lenguaje: | inglés |
Publicado: |
2015
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Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf |
_version_ | 1824347638741336064 |
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author | González Gutiérrez, José Javier |
author_facet | González Gutiérrez, José Javier |
author_sort | González Gutiérrez, José Javier |
collection | Tesis |
description | How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How
are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without
centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information
are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1
. Behavioral
extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent
model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized
trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a
generally valid model of decentralized price formation |
first_indexed | 2025-02-06T02:47:06Z |
format | Tesis |
id | eptesis-10990 |
institution | UANL |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2025-02-06T02:47:06Z |
publishDate | 2015 |
record_format | eprints |
spelling | eptesis-109902019-12-03T18:59:33Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/ Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets González Gutiérrez, José Javier How are prices set in a market economy with decentralized information? How are we able to extract full gains from trade in a competitive market without centrally coordinated price formation and resource allocation? In 1962, separate research efforts proved that neither rationality nor complete information are necessary market conditions to reach competitive equilibrium1 . Behavioral extensions to this framework have shown significant progress towards a coherent model of competitive price formation under varying conditions of decentralized trade and individual rationality. Unfortunately, economics continues to lack a generally valid model of decentralized price formation 2015 Tesis NonPeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/1080215488.pdf González Gutiérrez, José Javier (2015) Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets. Doctorado thesis, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León. |
spellingShingle | González Gutiérrez, José Javier Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/tesis.png |
title | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
title_full | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
title_fullStr | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
title_full_unstemmed | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
title_short | Intertemporal competitive equilibrium: a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
title_sort | intertemporal competitive equilibrium a computational model of intermediacy in speculative markets |
url | http://eprints.uanl.mx/10990/1/1080215488.pdf |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gonzalezgutierrezjosejavier intertemporalcompetitiveequilibriumacomputationalmodelofintermediacyinspeculativemarkets |