Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly
We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Sección de libro. |
| Lenguaje: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
2007
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| Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7774/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf |
| _version_ | 1824370534831357952 |
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| author | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
| author_facet | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
| author_sort | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. |
| collection | Repositorio Institucional |
| description | We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers |
| format | Sección de libro. |
| id | eprints-7774 |
| institution | UANL |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| record_format | eprints |
| spelling | eprints-77742015-10-09T18:57:10Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/7774/ Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms. Under these conditions, the firms may have two different types of optimal reaction at the Cournot equilibrium: weak or strong. We compare the profits and domestic social surplus and compare the volume of commodities for various combinations of weak and strong leaders and followers Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2007 Sección de libro. PeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/7774/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/7774/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2007) Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly. In: Innovative Computing, Information and Control, 2007. ICICIC '07. Second International Conference. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, N.J.. ISBN 9780769528823 |
| spellingShingle | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png |
| title | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_full | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_fullStr | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_short | Stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| title_sort | stackelberg equilibrium in a mixed duopoly |
| url | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7774/1/Stackelberg%20Equilibrium%20in%20a%20Mixed%20Duopoly.pdf |
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