Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models

We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ cl...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V., Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo, Kalashnikov, Vitaly
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Gordon and Breach 2010
Online Access:http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf

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