Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models

We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ cl...

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Autores principales: Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V., Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo, Kalashnikov, Vitaly
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: Gordon and Breach 2010
Acceso en línea:http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf
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author Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.
Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo
Kalashnikov, Vitaly
author_facet Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.
Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo
Kalashnikov, Vitaly
author_sort Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.
collection Repositorio Institucional
description We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ classification as strong or weak according to the agent’s optimal reaction function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type of Stackelberg equilibrium.
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spelling eprints-77652015-10-09T18:56:26Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/ Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ classification as strong or weak according to the agent’s optimal reaction function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type of Stackelberg equilibrium. Gordon and Breach 2010 Article PeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2010) Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models. Optimization: a journal of mathematical programming and operations research, 59 (5). pp. 689-706. ISSN 1026-7662
spellingShingle Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V.
Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo
Kalashnikov, Vitaly
Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
thumbnail https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png
title Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
title_full Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
title_fullStr Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
title_full_unstemmed Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
title_short Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
title_sort cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
url http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf
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