Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models
We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ cl...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Artículo |
Lenguaje: | inglés |
Publicado: |
Gordon and Breach
2010
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Acceso en línea: | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf |
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author | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
author_facet | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly |
author_sort | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. |
collection | Repositorio Institucional |
description | We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ classification as strong or weak according to the agent’s optimal reaction function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type of Stackelberg equilibrium. |
format | Article |
id | eprints-7765 |
institution | UANL |
language | English |
publishDate | 2010 |
publisher | Gordon and Breach |
record_format | eprints |
spelling | eprints-77652015-10-09T18:56:26Z http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/ Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly We investigate Cournot and Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a stateowned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a foreign firm searching to maximize its own profit, compete. First, we establish the existence and uniqueness results for the Cournot scheme, and propose the agents’ classification as strong or weak according to the agent’s optimal reaction function properties at the Cournot equilibrium. Then we examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of both firms in the Stackelberg schemes and compare the profits and domestic social surplus and the production volumes at each type of Stackelberg equilibrium. Gordon and Breach 2010 Article PeerReviewed text en cc_by_nc_nd http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1.haspreviewThumbnailVersion/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. y Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo y Kalashnikov, Vitaly (2010) Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models. Optimization: a journal of mathematical programming and operations research, 59 (5). pp. 689-706. ISSN 1026-7662 |
spellingShingle | Kalashnikov, Vyacheslav V. Cordero Franco, Álvaro Eduardo Kalashnikov, Vitaly Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
thumbnail | https://rediab.uanl.mx/themes/sandal5/images/online.png |
title | Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
title_full | Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
title_fullStr | Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
title_full_unstemmed | Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
title_short | Cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
title_sort | cournot and stackelberg equilibrium in mixed duopoly models |
url | http://eprints.uanl.mx/7765/1/Cournot%20and%20Stackelberg%20equilibrium%20in%20mixed%20duopoly%20models.pdf |
work_keys_str_mv | AT kalashnikovvyacheslavv cournotandstackelbergequilibriuminmixedduopolymodels AT corderofrancoalvaroeduardo cournotandstackelbergequilibriuminmixedduopolymodels AT kalashnikovvitaly cournotandstackelbergequilibriuminmixedduopolymodels |